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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________                        
 
No. 10-1559 
_____________ 
                         
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
FERNANDO BELTRAN 
also known as Victor Espinoza 
 
FERNANDO BELTRAN, 
                        Appellant                         
_____________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Criminal No. 1-06-cr-00199-011) 
District Judge: Honorable Christopher C. Conner 
_____________                         
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
July 14, 2011 
 
Before:  RENDELL SMITH and ROTH, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Opinion Filed: July 29, 2011)                      
_____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT                         
_____________ 
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge. 
 Fernando Beltran was convicted of various drug charges, criminal forfeitures, and 
offenses relating to attempted escape from custody.  Beltran only challenges his 
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convictions which relate to his attempt to escape custody, urging the insufficiency of the 
evidence.  He also claims that the government offered insufficient evidence to overcome 
the defense of entrapment and that the two-level increase in offense level for being an 
organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor of a criminal activity was inappropriate.  Our 
standard of review for sufficiency of the evidence challenges is plenary, but we will only 
reverse a jury verdict when the record contains no evidence from which a reasonable jury 
could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.  See United States v. Mussare, 405 F.3d 161, 
166 (3d Cir. 2005).  We exercise plenary review over legal questions regarding a 
challenge to sentencing enhancements and review the related factual findings for clear 
error.  United States v. Inigo, 925 F.2d 641, 658 (3d Cir. 1991).  We will affirm. 
 Beltran, along with Antonio Avila, was convicted of attempted escape from 
custody and related offenses.  The offense conduct originated when Beltran was moved to 
a cell with Amauris Sanchez.  Shortly thereafter, Beltran approached Sanchez about 
taking part in an escape.  Following a number of conversations, Sanchez approached 
authorities with the intent to cooperate.  Sanchez and Karen Brown, a prison counselor, 
took on the role of confidential informant for the authorities.  After a number of 
discussions between Beltran, Avila, Sanchez, and Brown, an escape plan was crafted 
based on a medical transport.  The plan resulted in bribes to fictitious guards for a 
smuggled cell phone and their cooperation in the escape.  Following the seizure of the 
second bribe – $40,000 to be used as the bribe to effectuate the actual escape – Avila and 
Beltran were charged.  
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Beltran’s first challenge is that the government failed to offer sufficient evidence 
to sustain a conviction for attempted escape from custody.  To prove attempted escape, 
the government must show intent, as well as corroborating evidence which amounts to a 
substantial step toward commission of the crime.  See United States v. Cicco, 10 F.3d 
980, 984 (3d Cir. 1993).  The substantial step may be shown through the conduct of a co-
conspirator.  See Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 647-48 (1946).  Beltran 
challenges the government’s evidence by claiming that his initial thoughts at escape 
amounted to “daydreams” and the rest of the planning was done by the CIs.  Therefore, 
he urges, the evidence does not support intent on his part.  In actuality, the government 
showed that his intent originated when he approached Sanchez.  It was his idea to break 
through the cinder blocks; while far-fetched, nonetheless, it showed that the idea of 
escape clearly started with Beltran.  The government also proved his intent through 
numerous recorded phone calls with his sister, directing her involvement in the attempted 
escape, which resulted in the sister’s supplying the guards with payments of $3,000 and 
$40,000.  Additionally, as the substantial step prong may be shown through the conduct 
of a co-conspirator, her delivery of the funds satisfies the substantial step element.  
Accordingly, his challenge must fail. 
For his second challenge, Beltran claims that insufficient evidence was offered to 
overcome the defense of entrapment.  To prove the defense of entrapment, the defendant 
must show (1) that the government induced the defendant to commit the crime and (2) 
that the defendant lacked the predisposition.  United States v. El-Gawli, 837 F.2d 142, 
145 (3d Cir. 1988).  Beltran’s argument assumes that he sustained his burden as to the 
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elements, but he failed to show a lack of predisposition.  Beltran attempts to characterize 
his initial thoughts of escape, which he approached Sanchez with, as daydreams due to 
the implausibility of cutting through the prison’s cinder block walls.  Beltran reasons that 
the implausible nature of his initial plan shows that he was not predisposed and that it 
was only the inducement by the CIs which resulted in his participating.  The government 
argues that Beltran’s intent was evinced by the fact that Beltran first approached Sanchez 
about the escape, and persisted with the effort despite Sanchez’s discouragement of the 
initial plan.  The government further points to the numerous phone calls placed by 
Beltran to his sister, most of which were to arrange the details about the payments needed 
to effectuate the escape, but also to convince his sister that the CIs could be trusted.  The 
fact that Beltran engaged Sanchez in the initial discussion and he continually participated 
in the attempt, including involving his sister, is enough to prove that he was predisposed 
to the crime.  It is clear that there was enough evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude 
that the defense of entrapment was unavailable to Beltran. 
Beltran’s final challenge is to the two-level enhancement for being an organizer, 
leader, manager, or supervisor of a criminal activity.  Section 3B1.1 of the Sentencing 
Guidelines requires a two-level increase in offense level when “the defendant was an 
organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor in any criminal activity.”  Application note 2 of 
Section 3B1.1 states that one can qualify if they are the supervisor of one or more 
individuals or if they “exercised management responsibility over the property, assets, or 
activities of a criminal organization.”  Beltran argues that the escape plan was the 
brainchild of the CIs and, although he recruited and directed his sister, it was at the 
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direction of the CIs.  The government urges that the enhancement was appropriate 
because he recruited his sister, Avila, and Sanchez into the attempted escape, he was a 
planner of the escape, and he directed his sister to send the money to bribe the fictitious 
guards for the cell phone and the eventual escape.  The District Court found that the 
enhancement was warranted because Beltran was the one to initially approach all parties 
and he directed his sister to send the key to the plan, the money.  We find no error in the 
District Court’s reasoning. 
Accordingly, we will affirm. 
